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The Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program, the largest of the 
social security programs, will not have sufficient resources to meet its 
benefit payments on time in July 1983. Even if the program were permitted to 
continue to borrow from the other social security programs, the financial 
shortfall would re-emerge in 1984. Recent projections show that the cash 
benefits programs, OASI and Disability Insurance (DI), together would need 
$150 to $290 billion in new revenues or benefit cuts to give a reasonable 
degree of assurance that they would make it to 1990 without further changes.' 
Assuming this short-range problem is met, the program should be solvent until 
about 2025, when the effects of the retirement of the baby boom generation 
will plunge the system into deficit. 
To solve social security's financing problems both in the short and long 
term, President Reagan appointed a bipartisan panel, the National Commision 
on Social Security Reform. On Jan. 15, 1983, a majority of its members 
reached agreement on a compromise solution that will produce $168 billion in 
additional revenue and benefit reductions by the end of this decade and 
reduce the projected long-range deficit by two-thirds. 
Congress is expected to begin consideration of the Commission's and other 
possible proposals immediately. The House Ways and Means Committee plans to 
have hearings in February, and have a bill before the full House by sometime 
in March. Primary jurisdiction in the Senate is in the Finance Committee. 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
Social Security and Its Relatives 
There are two social security programs, OASI and DI, that provide monthly 
cash benefits to retirees, the disabled and survivors. Both are financed 
with social security taxes. 
Medicare provides nationwide health benefits to many of the same persons 
who receive cash benefits through its two programs: Hospital Insurance (HI) 
financed with social security taxes, and Supplementary Medical Insurance 
(SMI).financed by General revenues and by premiums from participants. 
Medicaid, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) provide various simiiar forms of cash and health 
benefits, but they are means-tested and financed entirely by general revenues 
and State and local funds. 
Cash Benefits 
Social insurance concept. Social security is not ninsurance" in any sense 
recognizable by the business community or private actuaries. However, it is 
often viewed as a very broad type of "social insurancen under which the - - 
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u g r o u p , w  i n  t h i s  c a s e  9 0 %  o f  t h e  w o r k e r s  o f  t h e  n a t i o n ,  p o o l s  r e s o u r c e s  t o  
m e e t  t h e  w i d e  v a r i e t y  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  a n d  f a m i l y  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a r i s i n g  f r o m  t h e  
l o s s  o f  a w o r k e r ' s  e a r n i n g s  d u e  t o  r e t i r e m e n t ,  d e a t h  o r  d i s a b i l i t y .  A s  s u c h ,  
i t  h a s  w h a t  some r e f e r  t o  as  a m i x t u r e  o f  i n s u r a n c e  a n d  w e l f a r e  f e a t u r e s .  
W h i l e  w o r k . i n  c o v e r e d  e m p l o y m e n t  i s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  e l i g i b i l i t y ,  a n d  b e n e f i t s  
a r e  c o m p u t e d  u s i n g  o n e ' s  e a r n i n g s  h i s t o r y ,  t h e  v a r i o u s  f o r m s  o f  b e n e f i t s  a r e  
n o t  d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  o n e ' s  t a x  p a y m e n t s  ( f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  n o  
a d d e d  p remium i s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  s p o u s e ' s  b e n e f i t s  o r  s u r v i v o r  p r o t e c t i o n ) .  
E l i g i b i l i t y .  C a s h  b e n e f i t s  a r e  p a y a b l e  t o  " i n s u r e d  w o r k e r s N  i . . ,  t h o s e  
who h a v e  w o r k e d  a s u f f i c i e n t  a m o u n t  o f  t i m e  i n  j o b s  c o v e r e d  b y  s o c i a l  
s e c u r i t y )  a n d  t o  t h e i r  s p o u s e s  a n d  c h i l d r e n .  
- - F u l l  r e t i r e m e n t  b e n e f i t s  a r e  p a y a b l e  a t  a g e  6 5 ,  
b u t  b e n e f i t s  c a n  b e g i n  a s  e a r l y  a s  a g e  6 2  a t  r e d u c e d  
l e v e l s .  
- - D i s a b i l i t y  b e n e f i t s  a r e  p a y a b l e  i f  a w o r k e r  h a s  h a d  
r e l a t i v e l y  r e c e n t  a t t a c h m e n t  t o  t h e  w o r k f o r c e  a n d  
h i s  i m p a i r m e n t  i s  s o  s e v e r e  t h a t  i t  p r e c l u d e s  h i m  
f r o m  d o i n g  s u b s t a n t i v e  w o r k .  
- -Widowsv a n d  w i d 0 w e r . s '  b e n e f i t s  c a n  b e g i n  a t  a g e  
6 0  ( e a r l i e r  i f  t h e  s u r v i v i n g  s p o u s e  i s  d i s a b l e d  
o r  c a r i n g  f o r  t h e  deceased w o r k e r ' s  c h i l d r e n ) .  
B e n e f i t  c o m p u t a t i o n s .  B e n e f i t s  a r e  c a l c u l a t e d  u s i n g  much o f  a w o r k e r ' s  
e a r n i n g s  r e c o r d .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  b e n e f i t  f o r m u l a  i s  t i l t e d  t o  p r o v i d e  h i g h e r  
r e t u r n s  o n  t a x e s  t o  w o r k e r s  who h a v e  h a d  r e l a t i v e l y  l o w  e a r n i n g s .  B e n e f i t s  
a r e  n o t  m e a n s - t e s t e d ,  b u t ,  i f  a r e c i p i e n t  w o r k s  a n d  h a s  e a r n i n g s  a b o v e  a 
c e r t a i n  l e v e l ,  b e n e f i t s  a r e  f u l l y  o r  p a r t i a l l y  w i t h h e l d  ( t h i s  i s  s o m e t i m e s  
r e f e r r e d  t o  as  t h e  " r e t i r e m e n t  o r  e a r n i n g s  t e s t w ) .  
F i n a n c i n g  S t r u c t u r e  
P a y - a s - y o u - g o  c o n c e p t .  S o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  t a x e s  d o  n o t  b u i l d  up  i n  a " f u n d w  
f o r  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  o r  g r o u p  t o  meet t h e i r  e v e n t u a l  b e n e f i t s  ( a s  d o  p r i v a t e  
p e n s i o n  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ) .  T a x e s  a r e  s e t  i n  t h e  l a w  i n  a way t h a t  p r o d u c e s  o n l y  
e n o u g h  r e v e n u e s  t o  meet c u r r e n t  o b l i g a t i o n s .  C u r r e n t  w o r k e r s  s u p p o r t  c u r r e n t  
b e n e f i c i a r i e s ;  f u t u r e  w o r k e r s  w i l l  e v e n t u a l l y  s u p p o r t  t o d a y ' s  w o r k e r s  when 
t h e y  become  b e n e f i c i a r i e s .  
T a x a t i o n :  OASI,  D I  a n d  H I  a r e  f u n d e d  a l . m o s t  e n t i r e l y  w i t h  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  
tax  p r o c e e d s .  SMI r e c e i v e s  t h r e e - f o u r t h s  o f  i t s  i n c o m e  f r o m  t h e  G e n e r a l  
F u n d ,  o n e - f o u r t h  f r o m  p r e m i u m s  p a i d  b y  r e c i p i e n t s .  ( B e c a u s e  SMI i s  n o t  
f i n a n c e d  w i t h  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  t a x e s ,  u n l i k e  H I  i t  u s u a l l y  i s  n o t  c o n s i d e r e d  
i n  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  f i n a n c i n g .  Even  H I  i s  o f t e n  t a k e n  u p  o n l y  
p e r i p h e r a l l y . )  
- -The o v e r a l l  t a x  r a t e  i s  6 . 7 %  p a i d  b y  e m p l o y e e  
a n d  e m p l o y e r  e a c h  ( 1 3 . 4 %  c o m b i n e d )  o n  e a r n i n g s  
u p  t o  $ 3 5 , 7 0 0  i n  1 9 8 3 .  ( T h e  t a x  r a t e  i s  9 . 3 5 %  f o r  
t h e  s e l f - e m p l o y e d . )  
--The t a x  r a t e  i s  s c h e d u l e d  t o  r i s e  i n  t h r e e  s t e p s  
t o  7 . 6 5 %  i n  1 9 9 0 .  T h e  maximum e a r n i n g s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  
t a x  w i l l  r i s e  e a c h  y e a r  a t  t h e  same r a t e  t h a t  a v e r a g e  
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e a r n i n g s  r i s e  i n  t h e  e c o n o m y .  
- - D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t a x  r e c e i p t s  among t h e  p r o g r a m s  ( 1 9 8 2 ) :  
O A S  I 
68% 
T r u s t  F u n d s  
E a c h  p r o g r a m  has i t s  own t r u s t  f u n d ,  w h o s e  e n t i r e  a s s e t s  a r e  i n v e s t e d  i n  
U . S .  g o v e r n m e n t  s e c u r i t i e s .  T h e  t r u s t  f u n d s  s e r v e  o n l y  a c o n t i n g e n c y  p u r p o s e  
i n  t h e  e v e n t  t h a t  a d v e r s e  c i r c u m s t a , n c e s  a r i s e  e l  a s e v e r e  r e c e s s i o n ) .  
P r e s e n t l y ,  t h e  c o m b i n e d  r e s e r v e s  o f  t h e  OASI,  D I  a n d  H I  f u n d s  r e p r e s e n t  l e s s  
t h a n  2 m o n t h s  w o r t h  o f  a s s e t s  ( s l i g h t l y  m o r e  t h a n  o n e  m o n t h  f o r  j u s t  O A S I  a n d  
D I ) .  T h e  s y s t e m  c a n n o t  f u n c t i o n  w i t h  l e s s  t h a n  o n e  m o n t h ' s  w o r t h  o f  b e n e f i t  
p a y m e n t  i n  r e s e r v e .  
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I n d i c a t o r s  o f  S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y ' s  Growth  a n d  R e l a t i v e  I m p o r t a n c e  
1 9 6 0  1 9 8 0  
(OASI a n d  D I  o n l y )  
... E x p e n d i t u r e  as  % o f  F e d e r a l  b u d g e t  1 2 . 6 %  2 0 . 6 %  
E x p e n d i t u r e  as  % o f  G N P  .............. 2 . 3 3 %  4 . 7 9 %  
Tax r a t e s  ............................ 3 . 0 %  5 . 0 8 %  
Taxes p a i d  b y  w o r k e r  w i t h  a v e r a g e  
e a r n i n g s  .......................... $ 1 2 0 . 2 1  $ 6 3 5 . 6 8  ...................... C o v e r e d  w o r k e r s  7 3  m i l l i o n  1 1 5  m i l l i o n  ......................... B e n e f i c i a r i e s  1 4  m i l l i o n  3 5  m i l l i o n  
W o r k e r  t o  b e n e f i c i a r y  r a t i o s  ......... 5 . 1  t o  1 3 . 3  t o  1 
E a r n i n g s  r e p l a c e m e n t  f o r  new r e t i r e e s  
( b e n e f i t s  as  a % o f  f i n a l  e a r n i n g s  ............... f o r  a v e r a g e  e a r n e r )  3 3 . 3 %  5 1 . 1 %  
S o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  as  % o f  p e r s o n a l  
i n c o m e  ............................ 2 . 8 %  5 . 6 %  
P o v e r t y  t r e n d s  ( %  i n  p o v e r t y )  1 9 5 9  
a n d  1980 ...................... Age 55 t o  6 4  2 1 . 5  9 . 5  .................. Age 6 5  a n d  o l d e r  3 5 . 2  1 5 . 7  .................. T o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  22 .4  1 3 . 0  
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THE FINANCING ISSUE 
History 
Financing shortfalls first appeared in the 1973 Trustees' report, and grew 
substantially worse with each succeeding report. Both near- and long-term 
problems emerged -- the near-term one was caused by adverse economic 
conditions, the long-term one by a technical flaw in the benefit formula and 
more pessimistic demographic trends. The OASI and DI trust funds would have 
been exhausted in the early 1980s if legislation had not been enacted in 1977 
raising taxes and curtailing future benefit growth. The legislation also 
corrected the technical flaw in the formula and substantially reduced the 
long-run deficit (estimated then to equal 40% of the program's cost). 
Even though significant increases in social security taxes were enacted in 
1977, the major increases were not scheduled to take effect until 1981 and 
later. In the meantime, the performance of the economy was much worse than 
expected. It is this fact that has caused continuing decline in the OASI 
reserves -- in fact, the estimates of future beneficiaries made in 1977 
turned out to be somewhat on the high side (specifically in the DI program), 
but not enough to offset the drain on the system caused by the adverse 
economic conditions. 
High unemployment, of course, reduces income because fewer workers are 
contributing to the system. It has been estimated that each one percent 
increase in unemployment reduces income, depending on residual effects, by $2 
to $4 billion a year. However, it . i s  generally agreed that the most 
important economic factor affecting social security financing is the growth 
in real wages -- i.e., the excess of the increase in wages over the increase 
in prices. When wages do not keep up with prices, increases in social 
security tax revenue do not keep pace with the increase in expenditures 
arising from the automatic adjustment of benefits to increases in prices. 
For example, in June 1980, beneficiaries received a 14.3% automatic cost of 
living increase, while the increase in average wages during the year ending 
June 1980 was only about 8.7%. The economic forecast underlying the 1977 
amendments assumed that real-wage growth would average over 2% during 1977 
through 1981; in fact wages grew more slowly than prices during most of that 
period. That is the crux uf the short-range financing problem. 
As the forecasts of the condition of the OASI trust funds have worsened 
over the past several years, stopgap measures have been enacted to buy time 
for the Congress to assess the significance of the problem. In 1980 revenues 
were reallocated from the DI program to the OASI program, but only for 
calendar years 1980 and 1981. In 1981 various relatively minor categories of 
benefits were cut by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, and at the end of 
the year authority was given for the trust funds to borrow from one another, 
but only until the end of 1982. The borrowing could not exceed the amount 
needea to assure benefit payments beyond June 1983. 
In May 1981 the President presented a package, consisting almost entirely 
of benefit reductions, that would solve social security's financing prob1e.m. 
After considerable adverse reaction from the public and Congress, the 
President withdrew the package and called for the creation of a bipartisan 
commission to come up with substantive solutions to social security's fiscal 
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crisis. The study group, called the National Commission on Social Security 
Reform, would report its recommendations by the end of 1982. In fact, the 
Commission could not agree on a set of recommendations by the scheduled date, 
but did arrive at a concensus agreement on a compromise package of proposals 
on Jan. 15, 1983. The package consisted of a combination of tax increases 
and benefit cuts, and are described in more detail later under the section 
that discusses options. 
Short-Term Problem (1983 to 1990) 
The OASI program is the only program in immediate trouble among the three 
financed by the social security tax, but the size of the OASI problem greatly 
exceeds the favorable situations of the DI and HI programs. Borrowings from 
the DI and HI funds made in December 1982 will keep OASI payments flowing 
only until June 1983 (the July payment won't be made on time without remedial 
legislation). Even if extended, interfund borrowing could not prevent all 
three funds from becoming exhausted by mid to late 1984. 
The National Commission on Social Security Reform estimated that $150 to 
$200 billion in new revenues or benefit cuts would be needed to give 
reasonable assurance that the system will be adequately financed until 1990. 
This assumes sluggish economic performance and minimal trust fund build-up. 
Intermediate Future Problem (Next 25 Years) 
Under the Social Security Trustees' 11-B projections, the OASI situation 
is predicted to improve in the early 1990s, even without legislation, because 
of the 1990 tax increase and a favorable demographic situation. The cash 
benefit programs are projected to recover from the 1980s' problems and 
actually build up fairly large reserves ($700 billion by 2015 in 1982 
dollars). 
However, financing problems in the HI program beginning in the late 1980s 
are projected to grow and exceed the favorable situations for the two cash 
benefits-programs. Thus, on a combined basis, all three funds would become 
inadequately financed in 1984 and not regain a favorable status during the 
next 25 years. 
Long-Run Problem (Next 75 Years) 
The retirement of the baby-boom generation in the first quarter of the 
next century is projected to erode the favorable OASDI situation (putting the 
HI problem aside), and by 2025 to 2030, financial problems would re-emerge 
(once again under the Intermediate 11-B forecast). In contrast to the more 
than three workers to finance each beneficiary which exists today and is 
projected to last throughout the next 25 years, there would be only two 
workers for each beneficiary by 2030. 
The financial shortfall for this later period is projected to equal about 
26% of the cost of the program. The OASDI portion of the tax rate would have 
to rise from about 11% today for employee and employer combined to 17% by 
.2030. (HI estimates are not usually made beyond a 25-year period, and even 
the 25-year forecast often is not considered very meaningful). 
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Public's Perception -- The "Imagew Problem 
Repeated adverse financial reports over the past decade have created a 
significant degree of public pessimism about the longevity of the social 
security system. Public opinion polls of the past 5 or 6 years have 
Consistently shown that substantial "doubts" exist that social security will 
survive, or that if it does, that it will provide much of a retirement 
benefit. Skepticism is most notable among workers under age 45. Recent 
examples : 
LA Times, Nov. 1982 Poll: 
--By 3 to 2, persons age 18-45 believed system "is 
in serious danger of going brokew (one-half of this 
group did not expect to receive social security 
benefits at all; one-half also favored making social 
security voluntary). 
Gallup (U.S. Chamber of Commerce) Poll, spring 1982: 
--By 6 to 1, workers who were interviewed felt the 
system had "major financial problemsn (63% believed they 
would get no benefits when they retired). 
OPTIONS 
Policy options for improving social security's financial condition have 
taken a wide variety of forms ranging from small, token changes to a complete 
overhaul of how workers plan and provide for the risks of retirement, death 
or disability. For discussion purposes, they are presented under two general 
headings: conventional and unconventional proposals. These are generic 
options that are among the standard "bill of farew usually mentioned as ways 
of solving social security's financing dilemma. At the end of this section, 
the specific financing recommendations of the National Commission on Social 
Security Reform are described. 
Conventional Ideas 
These are the most frequently discussed types of solvency measures. They 
are labeled wconventionalw here because generally they are not intended to 
alter the pay-as-you-go or social welfare features of the pr.ograrn. They are 
, grouped into four categories: 
--raise social security taxes 
--find new sources of revenue 
--Constrain social security benefits 
--expana coverage. 
It is very likely that any financing package emerging from the 98th Congress 
will not rely on any one of these approaches alone to address the problem, 
but will in fact be a "mixn of them with the major issue being "how muchw of 
one or another is to be used. 
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1. Raise social security taxes. This approach typically calls for 
accelerating tax rate increases already scheduled in the law (i.e., moving up 
the 1985, 1986 or 1990 increases). Alternatives would raise the tax rate for 
the self-employed up to the combined employee/employer level, or raise the 
maximum amount of earnings subject to the tax. Yet another approach would 
raise taxes only for the employer. In addition, tax increase proposals 
frequently include provisions giving the employee an income tax deduction for 
part or all of his social security taxes to lessen the net increase he will 




--move 1990 increase up to 1984 .......... $135 billion 
--have no limit on taxable earnings ...... 80-85 billion 
Arguments for: This is the traditional approach of addressing social 
security's financial needs. Raising taxes consistently shows up as the 
favorite in public opinions polls when pitted against benefit reductions. It 
also addresses the program's financial problems without disrupting the plans 
of those approaching retirement, and it dampens further erosion of public 
confidence about the long-run survival of the social security benefit 
package. Proponents further point out that a tax increase can be spread more 
thinly among workers than a benefit cut of comparable size among recipients, 
since there are three times as many workers as recipients. 
Arguments against: A significant tax increase might hurt the Nation's 
recovery from the current recession, by increasing business costs and 
reducing a worker's disposable income. It also would raise the cost of labor 
at a time when unemployment is at its highest level since the Depression. It 
further would antagonize many workers who won't see the trade-off against 
benefit reductions when the larger tax deduction is taken from their pay, 
particularly younger workers who think they will not get benefits anyway or 
that they will get l*poorn rates of return (their belief being that they are 
throwing money away on a "badw system). 
2. Find new sources of revenue. This approach calls for coming up with 
new sources of income to supplement the social security tax. Using general 
revenues is the most commonly discussed alternative, having been a highly 
visible option since the inception of the program (only the SHI program uses 
them in any significant way now). Others call for increasing excise taxes on 
such things as alcohol and tobacco products (with earmarking of such revenues 
for the DI and HI programs because of the connection of the consumption of 
these products with health problems) or on gasoline (which would address 
jointly the social security and energy conservation issues). Yet another 
approach would be to subject part or all of a recipient's benefits to the 
income tax as is the case for unemployment insurance, private pensions and 
other retirement-type benefits. 
CRS- 9 
New income to system 
(1983 to 1989) 
-- reallocate one-half of HI tax rate to OASI, 
reimburse HI out of general revenues ........ $177 billion 
- - increase excise tax on alcohol and tobacco... 1 4  billion . 
Arguments for: Many people feel that the social security tax is a "badw 
tax -- it raises labor costs and is considered regressive. The use of 
general revenues is thought to be less regressive (i-e., to the extent that a 
tax increase u'ltimat.ely arose, it would be with the more progressive income 
tax), and would not necessarily impose a new tax increase on the economy at a 
time when it is attempting to pull out of a bad recession. It further avoids 
imposing benefit cuts on people who now are living on their social security 
benefits or counting on them in the near future. 
Selective excise tax increases would raise revenues while possibly 
discouraging consumption of goods thought by many to be harmful to the 
individual, or in the case of oil products, to the economy. 
Arguments against: Critics feel that using general revenues simply would 
transfer the problem from one "troubledn fund to another (since the General 
Fund also is running an enormous $150-$200 billion deficit next year alone). 
They argue that "fiscal discipline1* (paying for benefit improvement with tax 
proceeds) would be lost and little or no "brakew would exist to ward off 
excessive expansions of benefits. Others argue that using general revenues 
would lead ultimately to measuring "needw as a condition for benefits, by 
forcing social security to compete against other government programs for 
scarce resources. They also argue that any movement away from using the 
social security tax would weaken the worker's support for social security (by 
causing him to view it as less of a system that he paid for directly). 
3. Cutti'ng social security benefits. Typically this calls for 
constraining the growth of future benefits. It usually doesn't involve 
reducing benefits for current recipients, and future benefit. levels very 
likely would rise above today's levels (but not as high as if they were not 
altered). Among the benefit reductions most frequently discussed are 
reducing or delaying cost-of-living adjustments (COLA's), raising the age of 
eligibility for retirement benefits or the age at which full benefits can be 
received, and altering the benefit formula to produce lower across-the-board 
"initial benefitsw for future recipients. 
Savings 
(1983-1989) 
-- reduce COLA by 2 percentage points...$l03 to $113 billion 
-- delay COLA for 3 months.. ............ $23-$35 billion 
-- age and -benefit formula changes are 
viewed mostly as long-run measures, 
with little or no savings in short run 
A r g u m e n t s  for: Many a n a l y s t s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  p r o g r a m ' s  n e a r - t e r m  
f i n a n c i n g  . p r o b l e m  i s  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  o v e r l y  g e n e r o u s  a u t o m a t i c  b e n e f i t  
i n c r e a s e s .  T h e y  a r g u e  t h a t  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  r e c i p i e n t s  h a v e  f a r e d  b e t t e r  t h a n  
t h e  w o r k e r s  w h o s e  t a x e s  s u p p o r t  t h e  p r o g r a m  ( r e c i p i e n t s  h a v e  r e c e i v e d  f u l l  
i n f l a t i o n  a d j u s t m e n t s  o f  t h e i r  b e n e f i t s  w h i l e  w o r k e r s '  w a g e s  h a v e  n o t  k e p t  u p  
w i t h  i n f l a t i o n ) .  T h e y  a r g u e  t h a t  t e m p o r a r i l y  d e l a y i n g  o r  r e d u c i n g  t h e  s i z e  
o f  b e n e f i t  i n c r e a s e s  w o u l d  s a v e  s u b s t a n t i a l  s u m s  i n  t h e  n e a r - t e r m  w i t h o u t  
g r e a t l y  h a r m i n g  a n y  s i n g l e  s u b g r o u p  o f  r e c i p i e n t s .  
R a i s i n g  t h e  r e t i r e m e n t  a g e  i s  j u s t i f i e d  o n  t h e  b a s i s  t h a t  p e o p l e  l i k e l y  
w i l l  l i v e  l o n g e r  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  a n d  r e c e i v e  b e n e f i t s  f o r  l o n g e r  p e r i o d s  o f  
t h e i r  l i v e s  t h a n  c u r r e n t  r e c i p i e n t s  d o .  
C o n s t r a i n i n g  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  t h e  b e n e f i t  f o r m u l a  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  o f t e n  i s  
j u s t i f i e d  on t h e  basis  t h a t  r e p l a c e m e n t  r a t e s  ( b e n e f i t s  as  a p e r c e n t  o f  p r i o r  
e a r n i n g s )  w e r e  n o t  d e l i b e r a t e l y  p e r m i t t e d  t o  r i s e  a f t e r  1 9 7 2  ( b e i n g  a n  
u n i n t e n d e d  a b e r r a t i o n  o f  p r o v i d i n g  a u t o m a t i c  i n f . l a t i o n  a d j u s t m e n t s ) ,  a n d  a 
g r a d u a l  r e t u r n  t o  1 9 7 2  r e p l a c e m e n t  l e v e l s  w o u l d  g o  a l o n g  way t o w a r d  r e d u c i n g  
t h e  p r o g r a m ' s  l o n g - r u n  p r o b l e m .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  b e n e f i t s  c o u l d  s t i l l  r i s e  i n  
" r e a l H  terms e v e n  i f  r e p l a c e m e n t  r a t e s  were r e d u c e d .  
A r g u m e n t s  a g a i n s t :  C r i t i c s  a r g u e  t h a t  c u t t i n g  f u t u r e  b e n e f i t s  b r eaks  t h e  
s o - c a l l e d  " s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t v 1  b e t w e e n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  w o r k e r s .  A l t h o u g h  n o  
c o n t r a c t  e x i s t s  i n  a t r u l y  l e g a l  s e n s e ,  many a r g u e  t h a t  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  
c a r r i e s  a l o n g - t e r m  m o r a l  c o m m i t m e n t .  T h e y  a r g u e  t h a t  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  
b e n e f i t s  a r e  s t i l l  q u i t e  l o w  f o r  many w o r k e r s ,  t h a t  m o s t  o t h e r  s o u r c e s  o f  
i n c o m e  f o r  r e c i p i e n t s  a r e  f i x e d ,  a n d  t h a t  p r i v a t e  p e n s i o n s  h a v e  n o t  s h o w n  
much t e n d e n c y  t o  g r o w  a n d  f i l l  t h e  g a p  b e t w e e n  w h a t  a r e c i p i e n t  n e e d s  a n d  
w h a t  h e  r e c e i v e s  f r o m  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y .  T h e y  a l s o  a r g u e  t h a t  r e d u c i n g  
b e n e f i t s  w i l l  r a i s e  t h e  p o v e r t y  r a t e  among t h e  e l d e r l y ,  s i n c e  s o  many 
r e c i p i e n t s  r e l y  on  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  f o r  m o s t  o f  t h e i r  i n c o m e .  T h e y  f u r t h e r  
c o n t e n d  t h a t  r a i s i n g  t h e  r e t i r e m e n t  a g e  w i l l  h i t  t h e  m o s t  e c o n o m i c a l l y  
v u l n e r a b l e  members o f  s o c i e t y  t h e  h a r d e s t  -- t h o s e  i n  a r d u o u s  o c c u p a t i o n s ,  
t h e  d i s a b l e d  o r  i m p a i r e d ,  t h e  u n e m p l o y e d  a n d  m i n o r i t i e s .  F i n a l l y ,  l i k e  t a x  
i n c r e a s e s ,  t h e y  a r g u e  t h a t  b e n e f i t  r e d u c t i o n s  w i l l  w o r s e n  " e x p e c t e d w  f u t u r e  
r a t e s  o f  r e t u r n  f o r  t h o s e  a l r e a d y  s k e p t i c a l  a b o u t  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  s y s t e m .  
4 .  E x p a n d i n g  c o v e r a g e .  Mos t  F e d e r a l  e m p l o y e e s  d o  n o t  p a y  i n t o  s o c i a l  
s e c u r i t y ,  b u t  i n t o  t h e i r  own c i v i l  s e r v i c e  p e n s i o n  s y s t e m .  S t a t e  a n d  l o c a l  
g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  n o n p r o f i t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  h a v e  a n  o p t i o n  o f  . w h e t h e r  t o  
p a r t i c i p a t e ,  w h i c h  h a s  r e s u l t e d  i n  some 3 0 %  o f  S t a t e  a n d  l o c a l  e m p l o y e e s  a n d  
20% o f  n o n p r o f i t  e m p l o y e e s  b e i n g  e x c l u d e d .  P r o p o s a l s  t o  c o v e r  t h e s e  w o r k e r s  
m a n d a t o r i l y  w o u l d  b r i n g  s u b s t a n t i a l  r e s o u r c e s  i n t o  t h e  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  
p r o g r a m  b o t h  i n  t h e  n e a r  a n d  l o n g - t e r m  ( a l t h o u g h  t h e  m o r e  o b v i o u s  f i n a n c i a l  
g a i n  w o u l d  be i n  t h e  n e a r - t e r m ) .  T h e y  r a n g e  f r o m  c o v e r i n g  a l l  w o r k e r s  
( i n c l u d i n g  t h o s e  who h a v e  h a d  many y e a r s  o f  s e r v i c e  u n d e r  a s e p a r a t e  S t a f f  
p l a n )  t o  o n l y  new h i r e s  ( s o m e t i m e s  t h e  new h i r e s  a p p r o a c h  i n c l u d e s  t h o s e  n o t  
y e t  v e s t e d  u n d e r  c i v i l  s e r v i c e ,  i . e . ,  t h o s e  w i t h  l e s s  t h a n  5 y e a r s  o f  
s e r v i c e ) .  T h e y  a l s o  r a n g e  f r o m  c o v e r i n g  o n l y  F e d e r a l  w o r k e r s  t o  c o v e r i n g  a l l  
p r e s e n t l y  e x c l u d e d  w o r k e r s .  
N e w  i n c o m e  t o  s y s t e m  
( 1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 9 )  
-- c o v e r  a l l  F e d e r a l ,  S t a t e  a n d  l o c a l ,  
and nonprofit workers ............... $117 billion 
-- cover new Federal, State and local 
................. and nonprofit hires $ 35 billion 
- - cover new Federal hires and all 
nonprofits .......................... $ 21 billion 
Arguments for: Since social security has many social welfare features, 
advocates argue that these excluded workers do not pay their fair share of 
the Nation's social costs by avoiding the portion of such costs built into 
the social security system. Advocates also point out that these workers 
often get "heavily weightedu benefits intended not for them but for long-term 
low wage earners (because in computing benefits, the social security system 
does not consider this worker's full eaqnings history, i.e., his noncovered 
work). They further point out that social security protection is often 
better for younger workers than government staff plans, particularly for 
survivor and disability protection. 
Arguments against: Critics argue that this question should not be decided 
solely on the grounds that social security is having financial troubles. 
They argue that government workers have their own systems and are not the 
cause of social security's financial woes. They view coverage under social 
security as a back door way of cutting their benefit package (by imposing an 
earnings test or reduced benefits for early retirement). They view 
themselves as being "under attackw (for being part of the "bloated 
bureaucracyu) and are fearful of further measures to alter their 
compensation, including fringe benefits. 
State and local critics argue that mandatory coverage would be tantamount 
to Federal taxation of the States (and therefore unconstitutional) and if 
implemented would cause substantial and very complicated restructuring of 
many existing staff plans. 
Unconventional Ideas 
Numerous proposals have emerged in recent years raising what many view as 
fundamental questions about social security. The current financial problems 
confronting the system are used as the stepping off point for promoting a 
complete overhaul for how society goes about addressing the income 
requirements of the elderly, the disabled and families of deceased workers. 
Their major purpose is to change either how the program distributes its 
resources or to turn much of its function over to the private sector. 
Typically the arguments are that the program is grossly inequitable and/or 
that its financing is uinherently unstablee' because it is pay-as-you-go and 
relies on the government's *'witheringu ability to raise taxes. 
1. Giving a bigger role to the private sector. These proposals often are 
confused with the idea of making social security completely voluntary. 
Generally, advocates of giving a larger role to the private sector would 
continue to mandate that people put resources aside, while they work, for 
their retirement (or for the risks of early death or disability). Some want 
to give people a choice between social security and a private sector 
alternative. Others would dismantle social security and require people to 
set money aside in private plans (savings, IRAs, private pensions, etc.). 
Some call for immediately dismantling social security, giving workers bonds 
or the like for their existing contributions to the system, and financing 
current benefits out of General revenues. others call for a more gradual 
phase-out of social security, perhaps accomplished over 30 or more years (for 
instance, by requiring that young workers pay into a private fund rather than 
social security). 
The primary intent of these proposals is to create a more direct link 
between what a worker puts into a plan and what he gets out, and to'have him 
put the resources away during his productive years (often referred to as full 
or advance funding) rather than requiring future workers to come up with the 
resources for his benefits. 
Arguments for: Advocates believe these approaches would result in more 
adequate funding of retirement and related income needs, because in private 
sector plans, resources would be set aside in advance of receipt of the 
benefits. They wouldn't rely on the wwillingness" of future workers to 
accept taxation. 
They picture the current system as just a massive "money machine" that 
attempts to redistribute resources between those- who work and those who do 
not, but that it doesn't direct its benefits to those most in need since it 
doesn't use a means-test. They further argue that poverty levels among the 
elderly are generally no higher than for the rest of the population, being in 
the 10% to 15% range, and that the bulk of the workforce does not need a 
massive "income redistribution programw to meet its retirement income and 
related needs. Finally, they argue that redirecting money to the private 
sector would increase "investmentw resources in the economy, thereby 
stimulating capital formulation, and creating strong economic growth. 
Arguments against: critics point out that giving people an option to 
choose between social security and a private sector alternative would further 
weaken if not destroy social security's financing base. If a substantial 
number of workers opted into a private sector plan, the social security tax 
would have to rise for everyone else. Moreover, the well-to-do (the group 
most likely to opt out) would be the ones able to avoid paying for the social 
costs built into the system. Conversely, those with the highest "risksw 
would be the ones likely to stay in (creating what is known as adverse 
selection). 
With regard to plans to dismantle social security, critics argue that 
there really is no way to get from here to there without putting an 
astronomical burden on the General Fund (in order to pay for the benefits of 
those continuing under the current system). They also argue that social 
security does not inhibit savings and investment, that its mere existence has 
made people more aware of the need to set aside resources for their later 
years. Finally, they argue that the poverty rate among the elderly would 
rise significantly if social security were dismantled, and many older persons 
would have to "suffer the indignities" of going on what they would view as 
"public relief . I 1  
2. Two-tier benefit programs. The primary objective of these types of 
plans is to separate the social or welfare features of social security from 
its annuity functions. The financing issue is more or less a secondary one, 
although advocates like to point out that expenditures would be reduced under 
t w o - t i e r  p l a n s  s i n c e  p a y m e n t s  t o  t h o s e  n o t  " i n  n e e d w  would  b e  r e d u c e d .  W h i l e  
numerous  t w o - t i e r  p l a n s  h a v e  b e e n  p r o p o s e d ,  t h e y  g e n e r a l l y  f a l l  w i t h i n  two 
v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  f r a m e w o r k s .  
One h a s  a  f i r s t  t i e r  which  p r o v i d e s  w h a t  m i g h t  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a  " u n i v e r s a l  
b e n e f i t "  p a y a b l e  t o  e v e r y o n e  ,at a c e r t a i n  a g e .  I t  i s  n o t  a  m e a n s - t e s t e d  
b e n e f i t .  I t  i s  e x p e c t e d  t h a t  t h i s  t i e r  would  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t a k e  t h e  p l a c e  of  
t h e  w e i g h t e d  b e n e f i t  f o r m u l a  a n d  d e p e n d e n t s  b e n e f i t s  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  s y s t e m .  
A w o r k e r  w o u l d  t h e n  s u p p l e m e n t  t h i s  f i r s t  t i e r  w i t h  a n  " e a r n e d w  b e n e f i t  f r o m  
w o r k i n g .  The amount  h e  r e c e i v e s  would  b e  d i r e c t l y  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  t h e  amount  
o f  h i s  a v e r a g e  e a r n i n g s  -- t h e  t i l t  i n  t h e  c u r r e n t  f o r m u l a  would  b e  removed  
( a n d  b e n e f i t s  would  be c o m p u t e d  as a f l a t  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  o n e ' s  a v e r a g e  
e a r n i n g s )  . 
The s e c o n d  a p p r o a c h  would  s e t  a s p e c i f i e d  d o l l a r  a m o u n t  as  t h e  a c c e p t e d  
"minimum i n c o m e  g u a r a n t e e . "  A s  i n  t h e  f i r s t  a p p r o a c h ,  a  w o r k e r  would  g e t  a n  
" e a r n e d n  b e n e f i t  f r o m  h i s  work based on  a  f l a t - r a t e  b e n e f i t  f o r m u l a .  
However ,  t h e  t i e r s  would  b e ' r e v e r s e d .  If h i s  e a r n e d  b e n e f i t  w e r e  l e s s  t h a n  
t h e  w g u a r a n t e e d  l e v e l , "  h e  w o u l d  r e c e i v e  a s u p p l e m e n t  t o  b r i n g  h i m  up  t o  t h a t  
l e v e l .  The  s u p p l e m e n t ,  h o w e v e r ,  wou ld  b e  b a s e d  on h i s  " n e e d w  as  d e t e r m i n e d  
b y  a m e a n s - t e s t .  I f  h i s  e a r n e d  b e n e f i t  e x c e e d e d  t h e  g u a r a n t e e  l e v e l ,  h e  
w o u l d n '  t g e t  a  s u p p l e m e n t .  
The w e l f a r e  t i e r s  o f  e i t h e r  o f  t h e s e  p l a n s  p r e s u m a b l y  w o u l d  b e  f i n a n c e d  
f r o m  g e n e r a l  r e v e n u e s .  
A r g u m e n t s  f o r :  A d v o c a t e s  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  c u r r e n t  s y s t e m  d o e s  n o t  address  
i t s  s o c i a l  o r  w e l f a r e  g o a l s  e f f e c t i v e l y .  They a r g u e  t h a t  i t  p r o v i d e s  " s o c i a l  
t y p e n  b e n e f i t s  t o  p e r s o n s  o f  s u b s t a n t i a l  means  ( f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  l a r g e r  a 
w o r k e r ' s  b e n e f i t ,  t h e  l a r g e r  w i l l  be  h i s  s p o u s e ' s  b e n e f i t .  T h u s ,  a  minimum 
wage e a r n e r  t o d a y  i s  p a y i n g  f o r  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  f a m i l y  b e n e f i t s  p r o v i d e d  
t o  a w e a l t h y  r e t i r e d  c o u p l e ) .  T h e y  a r g u e  t h a t  d i v i d i n g  t h e  p r o g r a m ' s  w e l f a r e  
a n d  a n n u i t y  f e a t u r e s  would  l e s s e n  o r  e l i m i n a t e  t h e s e  * w a s t e f u l w  b e n e f i t s .  
They f u r t h e r  a r g u e  t h a t  c r e a t i n g  w i n d i v i d u a l l y - b a s e d n  e a r n e d  a n d  s u p p l e m e n t a l  
b e n e f i t s  w o u l d  remove  many b e n e f i t  i n e q u i t i e s  t h a t  e x i s t  b e t w e e n  s i n g l e  
w o r k e r s  a n d  c o u p l e s ,  a n d  b e t w e e n  o n e  a n d  t w o - e a r n e r  c o u p l e s .  
A r g u m e n t s  a g a i n s t :  C r i t i c s  o f  t h e s e  a p p r o a c h e s  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e y  would  
c r e a t e  g r e a t e r  s o c i a l  s t r a t i f i c a t i o n .  The c u r r e n t  s y s t e m  d o e s  n o t  l a b e l  a n y  
p o r t i o n  o f  i t s  b e n e f i t s  as  w e l f a r e ,  a n d  a v o i d s  many o f  t h e  c o n n o t a t i o n s  a n d  
images o f  w e l f a r e - t y p e  p r o g r a m s .  They f e e l  t h a t  by c r e a t i n g  t h i s  w e l f a r e  
" s t i g m a , "  t h e  w o r k e r ' s  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  s y s t e m  would  b e  e r o d e d .  They a l s o  
a r g u e  t h a t  b e n e f i t s  w o u l d  b e  r e d u c e d  f o r  many " n o n - w e a l t h y v 1  d e p e n d e n t s  a n d  
s u r v i v o r s .  They  f u r t h e r  a r g u e  t h a t  t h i s  t y p e  o f  c h a n g e  w o u l d  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
b r i n g  a b o u t  a n y  f u r t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  s e c u r i t y  t o  t h e  s y s t e m ,  s i n c e  i t  would  
m e r e l y  move t h e  c o s t s  f r o m  o n e  f u n d  t o  a n o t h e r ,  a n d  a n y  i n h e r e n t  w e a k n e s s e s  
o f  " p a y - a s - y o u - g o n  f i n a n c i n g  w o u l d  c a r r y  o v e r  t o  t h e  new " e a r n e d - b e n e f i t n  
t i e r .  
N a t i o n a l  Commiss ion  o n  S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y  Reform R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  
The f o l l o w i n g  i s  a l i s t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t h a t  
a f f e c t  t h e  f i n a n c i n g  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  p r o g r a m  a n d  t h e i r  c o s t  e f f e c t s .  
I t  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  s a v i n g s  a n d  r e v e n u e s  p r o d u c e d  a r e  e s t i m a t e s  a n d  
c a n  v a r y  w i d e l y  d e p e n d i n g  upon  w h a t  a s s u m p t i o n s  a r e  u s e d .  I t  i s  a l s o  
n o t e w o r t h y  t h a t  t h e  Commiss ion  s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e j e c t e d  t h e  n u n c o n v e n t i o n a l n  
approach and chose instead among the "conventional" ideas mentioned above. 
(1) The OASDI tax schedule would be accelerated. The 1985 rate would be 
moved to 1984, the 1985-87 rates would remain as scheduled under present law, 
part of the 1990 rate would be moved to 1988, and the rate for 1990 and after 
would remain unchanged. The HI tax rates for all years would remain 
unchanged. The resulting tax schedule would be: 
Employer and Employee Rate (each) 
OASDI OASDI-HI 









For 1984, a refundable income tax credit would be provided against the 
individual's Federal income-tax liability in the amount of the increase in 
the employee taxes over what would have been payable under present law. 
Revenues under this proposal would be $40 billion in 1984-1989 and +.02% of 
taxable payroll in the long range. 
(2) The automatic cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) of OASDI benefits, 
beginning in 1983, would be delayed 6 months, so that they are payable in 
January rather than in July. The increase in the CPI for purposes of the 
automatic adjustments for any particular year is currently measured from the 
first quarter of the previous year to the first quarter of that particular 
year. This procedure would continue to apply for the adjustment in benefit 
amounts for 1983 (payable in early January 1984). However, for subsequent 
years, the comparison would be made on a nthird quarter to third quartern 
basis. This proposal would save $40 billion 1983-1984 and .27% of payroll in 
the long run. 
(3) Mandatory OASDI coverage would be extended, as of Jan. 1, 1984, to all 
newly hired civilian employees of the Federal Government and all employees of 
nonprofit organizations. This proposal would produce $20 billion in 
1984-1989 and a net long-range revenue of +.30% of taxable payroll. 
(4) Beginning with 1984, 50% of OASDI benefits would be taxable for 
persons with Adjusted Gross Income (exc1udin.g OASDI benefits) of $20,000 
(single) or-$25,000 (married). Proceeds from such taxation would be credited 
to the OASDI Trust Funds. This proposal would produce $30 billion in 
1984-1989 and +.60% of taxable payroll in the long run. 
( 5 )  The OASDI tax rates for self-employed persons, beginning in 1984, 
would be equal to the combined employer-employee rates. One-half of the 
OASDI taxes paid by self-employed persons would be tax deductib1.e. This 
proposal would produce $18 billion in 1984-1989 and +.19% of taxable payroll 
in the long range. 
( 6 )  A lump-sum payment to the OASDI Trust Funds would be made from the 
General Fund of the Treasury for: 
-- the present value of the estimated additional 
benefits arising from the gratuitous military 
service wage credits for service before 1957; 
-- the amount of the combined employer-employee 
OASDI taxes on.the gratuitous military service 
wage credits for service after 1956 and before 
1983 (the co'st of which is met, under present 
law, when additional benefits derived 
therefrom are paid). In the future, the OASDI 
Trust Funds would be reimbursed on a current 
basis for such employer-employee taxes on such 
wage credits for service after 1982; and 
-- the amount of uncashed OASDI checks issued in the 
past (which were charged against the trust funds 
at time of issue), estimated at about $300-400 million. 
The effect of these proposals is to add $20 billion to the trust funds in 
1983, with a net effect in 1983-1989 of +$18 billion (due to some additional 
costs in 1984 and 1985). There is no long-range effect. 
(7) Withdrawal by State and local government employees would be 
prohibited. Termination notices now pending would be invalid if the process 
of termination, which takes at least 2 years, is not completed by the date of 
enactment. This would save $3 billion in 1983-1989 with negligible effect in 
the long run. 
The other commission recommendations, which have minor effects, are 
summarized in the following table. 
P r o p o s a l  
E l i m i n a t e  w i n d f a l l  b e n e f i t s  f o r  
p e r s o n s  w i t h  p e n s i o n s  f r o m  
n o n c o v e r e d  e m p l o y m e n t  
C o n t i n u e  b e n e f i t s  o n  
r e m a r r i a g e  f o r  d i s a b l e d  
w i d o w ( e r )  s a n d  f o r  d i v o r c e d  
widow ( e r )  s 
I n d e x  d e f e r r e d  widow ( e r )  ' s 
b e n e f i t s  b a s e d  on w a g e s  
( i n s t e a d  o f  C P I )  
P e r m i t  d i v o r c e d  a g e d  s p o u s e  t o  
r e c e i v e  b e n e f i t s  when h u s b a n d  
i s  e l i g i b l e  t o  r e c e i v e  
b e n e f i t s  
- 
S h o r t - T e r m  Long-Range  
S a v i n g s ,  S a v i n g s  
1 9 8 3 - 8 9  ( p e r c e n t a g e  
( b i l l i o n s )  o f  p a y r o l l )  
I n c r e a s e  b e n e f i t  r a t e  f o r  d i s a b l e d  
w i d o w ( e r ) s  a g e d  5 0 - 5 9  t o  7 1  1 / 2 %  
o f  p r i m a r y  b e n e f i t  - .l 
R e a l l o c a t e  OASDI t a x  r a t e  
b e t w e e n  OASI a n d  D I  
A l l o w  i n t e r - f u n d  b o r r o w i n g  f r o m  
H I  by  O A S D I  f o r  1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 7  -- 
Base a u t o m a t i c  b e n e f i t  i n c r e a s e s  
i f  f u n d  r a t i o  i s  u n d e r  20%,  
w i t h  c a t c h - u p  i f  f u n d  r a t i o  
e x c e e d s  3 2 %  
I n c r e a s e  d e l a y e d  r e t i r e m e n t  c r e d i t  
f r o m  3 %  per  y e a r  t o  8 % ,  b e g i n n i n g  
i n  1 9 9 0  a n d  r e a c h i n g  8% i n  2 0 1 0  -- 
I n  t o t a l ,  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a r e  p r o j e c t e d  t o  
i n c r e a s e  O A S D I  t r u s t  f u n d  a s s e t s  by  $ 1 6 8  b i l l i o n  by t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  
decade,  a n d  r e d u c e  t h e  l o n g - r a n g e  d e f i c i t  f r o m  1 .8% t o  .58% o f  
t a x a b l e  p a y r o l l .  A l t e r n a t i v e  m e t h o d s  f o r  s o l v i n g  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  
l o n g - r a n g e  d e f i c i t  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  s t a t e m e n t s  b y  t h e  
members, b u t  n o  c o n s e n s u s  was r e a c h e d .  
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
01/15/83 -- The National Commission on Social Security Reform agreed 
on a compromise package of recommendations to solve 
the short- and long-term problems facing social security. 
09/03/82 -- President signed into law the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982 (H.R. 4961), including 
significant changes in the Medicare program. 
08/19/82 -- House and Senate passed conference agreement on 
H.R. 4961. 
12/29/81 -- President Reagan signed H.R. 4331 into law (P.L. 97-123), 
restoring minimum benefit and authorizing interfund 
borrowing for 1 year. 
12/16/81 -- House passed conference agreement on H.R. 4331, by a vote 
of 412-10. 
12/15/81 -- Senate passed conference agreement on H.R. 4331, by a vote 
of 96-0. 
10/15/81 -- Senate passed H.R. 4331 with interfund borrowing, tax 
reallocation and other measures, by a vote of 95-0. 
09/24/81 -- President Reagan shelved his social security financing 
proposals for a while, and called upon Congress to enact 
interfund borrowing while a bipartisan task force 
pursues more substantive financial solutions. 
08/13/81 -- President Reagan signed Omnibus Budget bill into law 
as P.L. 97-35. 
07/31/81 -- House and Senate approved conference agreement on 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (H.R. 3982) 
which includes a number of significant cutbacks in 
the social security program. House passed H.R. 4331 
(restoration of minimum benefit). 
05/12/81 -- Reagan Administration announced 14-point plan to 
correct social security short and long term financing 
problems. 
03/27/81 - 04/07/81 -- Social Security Subcommittee of House Ways 
and Means Committee conducted "tentative9* markup sessions on 
social. security financing legislation. 
02/17/81 -- Social Security Subcommittee began a series of hearings 
on the system's financial problems. 
10/09/80 -- President Carter signed H.R. 7670, creating P , L .  96-403 
(2-year tax reallocation -- DI to OASI). 
09/25/80 -- Senate passed H.R. 7670 and sent bill to President for 
signing. 
09/16/80 -- Senate Finance Committ.ees approved H . R .  7670 and H.R. 5295, 
with amendments, including tax reallocation measures 
previously passed by Senate in S. 2885. 
08/21/80 -- Senate Finance Committee ordered reported H . R .  5829, 
providing for $39 billion in income tax reductions 
for 1981. 
07/21/80 -- House passed H.R. 7670. 
07/01/80 -- Full House Ways and Means Committee approved 
H.R. 7670. 
06/30/80 -- Full Senate approved S. 2885, the FY81 Budget 
Reconciliation bill, including Finance Committee 
recommendation to reallocate tax rates to the OASI program. 
06/25/80 -- Subcommittee on Social Security of House Ways and 
Means Committee recommends 1980-1981 partial 
reallocation of DI rate to OASI program (H.R. 7670). 
06/19/80 -- Senate Finance Committee recommends 1980-81 partial 
reallocation of DI rate to OASI program as proof 
of budget reconciliation measures. 
03/17/80 -- Subcommittee on Social Security of House Committee 
on Ways and Means began 2 days of hearings on 
Social Security aspects of President's FY81 Budget. 
02/22/80 -- Senate Finance Committee began two days of hearings on 
social security financing. 
12/19/79 -- Senate passed Crude Oil windfall Profits Tax 
measure (H.R. 3919) including provision creating 
a taxpayers trust fund for possible use in providing 
payroll tax relief. 
11/08/79 -- House Ways and Means Committee began 3 days of 
hearings on VAT. 
11/01/79 -- Senate Finance Committee reported out H.R. 3919 with 
provision creating Taxpayers Trust Fund. 
09/28/79 -- Subcommittee on Social Security of House Committee 
on Ways and Means began 5 days of hearings on social 
security financing. 
08/01/79 -- House Republican leadership proposed $36 billion 
tax relief measure, including-partial rollback 
of social security tax increases. 
01/24/79 -- Democratic Caucus voted resolution calling for rollback 
of social security taxes in 1981. 
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